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I10WELL
Petitioner v. SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES
Contempt--Nature and Source of Court's Power.-Court has
offender for direct conto
[2a, 2b] Attorneys-Duties to Court.-An
has duty to
himself in court and
continue with
a trial he has undertaken and not unduly to delay it for any
.matter reasonably within his control; he must, lackvalid excuse, be present at all times during trial of case
in which he is sole counsel for a party, and as oflicer of court
he is bound to respect and comply with its pertinent and lawful orders given in open court in his presence.
[3] Contempt--Acts Constituting Contempt--Misconduct of Attorneys.-Attorney's failure to be present in court at announced hour for resumption of trial in which he is engaged,
thus interrupting trial and interfering with court proceedings,
constitutes contempt of court where he has no valid excuse.
[ 4] Id.-Acts Constituting Contempt--Misconduct of Attorneys.Though some weakness or illness may have contributed to
attorney's failure to appear punctually in court and such misconduct was not deliberately and maliciously planned dereliction of
where there appears to have been remissness and
failure in performance of duty on his part, coupled with ability
to
court is warranted in finding him guilty of contempt.
[5] Id.-Acts Constituting Contempt--Misconduct of Attorneys.Attorney's failure without valid excuse to be present in court
at announced hour for resumption of trial in which he is enconstitutes a contempt committed in immediate view
and presence of court, and hence a direct contempt which court
is empowered to punish summarily under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1211.
[6] Id.-Acts Constituting Contempt--Misconduct of Attorneys.If attorney's absence with its ensuing interruption of court
proceedings is occasioned by some cause not reasonably within
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 3; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 40.
[3] Attorney's failure to attend court or tardiness as contempt,
note, 59 A.L.R. 1272. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 9 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Contempt, § 11 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Contempt,§ 3; [2] Attorneys,§ 5;
[3-7] Contempt, § 15; [9] Contempt, § 72.
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facts to court
falls on attorney;
officer of court who under those circumstances
[7]

Contempt-Misconduct of
Court is not bound to believe
that he failed to appear in court
cause he
occasions he had
he should have heen present and when he

Id.-Nature and Source of Court's Power.-Power to
cate a direct contempt is
of
and
should be exercised with great "' '-'w~·m"'
[9] !d.-Remission of Punishment.-Whether
which t<xecution of punishment for direct contempt
on his failure to attend eourt at announced hour should be
remitted in whole or in part is question whieh
quired into by trial court on proper

PROCEEDING in certiorari to review an order of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County
guilty of contempt of court.
Judgment affirmed.
A. Brigham Rose for Petitioner.
Harold \V. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los
B. Anson, David D. Mix and William E.
County Counsel, for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-In this certiorari proceeding petitioner
seeks annulment of an order of
adjudging him guilty of a direct contempt of court and sentencing him to serve "five 24-hour days" in the county
vVe have concluded that, contrary to petitioner's contention,
the court correctly held petitioner's acts to constitute a
rather than an indirect, contempt, and that the
should be affirmed.
The record shows that petitioner was sole counsel for defendant in a felony prosecution entitled People v. Pardini,
Los Angeles County number 160665. Trial of the case before
respondent court with a jury commenced on Pebruary 23,
and
1954. Petitioner was present at the trial on that
on the morning of February 24. At uoon on the 24th the
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declarrd
consider
the second time in this identical case
in eon" in the
Exeention of the sentence was stayed until
of the criminal trial.
for annulment pPtitioner urges there was no
bnt that if any occurred it was indirect, that is,
1llat it IYas not c-ommitted in the innnediate view and presence
anr] could therefore be pnnished
after affiand
as provided for in sections 1211,
aml 1217 of the Code of Civil Proeednre.
Sretion 1209 of the Code of Civil Procedure der~lares that
omissions in respect to a court of
are contrmpts of the authorit.v
inso1rnt behavior toward thr
tending to interrupt the due
c·onrse of 11 trial
" :"'fisbelJavior in

or othrr wilfnl nrglrct or vioconnsrl ... , or other person,
to perform a judicial or ministerial

service
''
DisohPdienee of any lawful . . . order . . . of thr
eo nrt ;
nn1awfnl interference with the process or
a conrt . . . ''
of tl1e Code of Civil Procedure provides that
shall baye power: L 'ro preserve and enforce
ordrr in its immediate preRence; 2. To enforce order in the
before it .
3. To provide for the orderly
conduct of
before it ... ; 5. 'l'o control in furtlwrance of
the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
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[43 C.2d

in every matter
are in substance but restatements
of principles which have been
and enforced since
[1] As stated in In re
the dawn of modern
Terry (1888), 128 U.S. 289 [9 S.Ct.
32 L.Ed. 405],
the power
to
an offender for a direct contempt is, and from ''almost immemorial
ac<~eptea as an inherent power of courts upon the
and enforcement of which '
the existence and authority of the tribunals established to
the rights of the
citizen, whether of life, liberty, or
and whether
acts of the
or
the lawassailed by the
lessness or violence of individuals. It has relation to the class
of contempts
being committed in the face of a court,
imply a purpose to
or impair its authority, to obstruct
the transaction of its business, or to insult or intimidate those
charged with the duty of administering the law. Blackstone
thus states the rule: 'If the contempt be committed in the
face of the court, the offender may be instantly apprehended
and imprisoned, at the discretion of the judges, without any
further proof or examination .. .' " (See also Blodgett v.
Superior Court (1930), 210 CaL 1, 10 [290 P. 293, 72 A.L.R.
482]; People v. Turner (1850), 1 Cal. 152, 153.)
[2a] The duty of an attorney punctually to present himself in court and diligently to continue with a trial he had
undertaken and not to unduly delay it for any personal
matter reasonably within his control is clear; likewise it is
clear that when an attorney who is the sole counsel appearing for a defendant in a felony case absents himself from
the trial, he interrupts and effectively blocks, for the period
of his absence, all proceedings in that trial. The written
''Commitment on
'' made by the court in the present case, after reciting the facts as to the pendency of the
trial, the proceedings therein, petitioner's failure to appear
in the courtroom until the honr of 2 :45 p.m. and his statement that he had been asleep, continues, ''That said statement was not supported by any evidence or testimony and
which statement the Court declined to believe. That on not
less than ten prior occasions the said Lowell Lyons [petitioner] has either been substantially late or wholly failed
to attend said Court in Department 43 at times when cases
in which he was counsel of record were set for trial or other
proceedings when his presence was necessary and that on
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said Lowell
was adjudged guilty of
for
to appear in said
in a
was counsel of record and which was set
a.m. until the hour of 9 :55 a.m. and for
was sentenced to serve
,Jail of said County, which
an admonition against a repeconduct.
IT IS ORDERED Ai:\D ADJUDGED rfhat said Lowell
of
of Court and sentenced to serve
hours each in the County Jail of
this County." The factual elements of the commitment above
set forth are not challenged.
The commitment order thus establishes that the court concluded that petitioner had had the ability to appear punctually
at 2 o 'dock and that his :failure or neglect to appear was
wilful, i.e., with "a purpose or willingness to commit the
act, or make the omission." (See Pen. Code, §§ 7 ( subd. 1)
and 21; Code Civ. Proc., § 16; In re Trombley (1948), 31
Cal.2d
807-809 [193 P.2d 734] .) [3] It follows that
petitioner's failure to be present in court at the announced
hour for resumption of the trial in which he was engaged,
thus interrupting the trial and interfering with the court
proceedings, constituted contempt of court since, as petitioner
himself
and as the court found, he had no valid excuse.
(Cf. In re JYiackay (19341, 140 CaLApp. 400 [35 P.2d 385];
In re JJ1cHugh (1908), 152 Mich. 505 [116 N.W. 459]; 59
A.L.R. 1272-1273.) [4] Although as hereinafter mentioned
in relation to another aspect of the case it may be true that
some weakness or illness contributed in a measure to petitioner's failure to appear pnnctually, and that his misconduct
was not a deliberately and ma1iciously planned dereliction
of duty, nevertheless npon the record there appears to have
been a remissness and failure in performance of duty on
his part,
',vith ability to perform, which the court
was warranted in finding to constitute contempt.
[5] We are likewise satisfied that petitioner's conduct
eonstituted ''a contempt ... committed in the immediate
view and presence of the eourt'
a direct contemptwhich the court is empowered to punish summarily under
the provisions of seetion 1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is clear that the trial and the attorney's participation in
it are in the court's immediate view and presence and, obviously, petitioner's obstruction of the trial by absenting

himself from
presence and
other conduct
him
[6]
in truth, the
of the court nr,oce:ecinu~'S
sonably within the
is but
burden of
falls upon the
the officer of the court who under those
a
of proceeding. 'l'he effect of a
be to absolve the defaulting
from any
explanation of his absence, no matter how
repeated, unless the judge takes the burden of
and instituting formal proceedings. 'l'his would make of
the judge not a judicial officer carrying out the
of his office, but a complaining witness in an
ceeding. Such a rule, we think, would not
to long established law but would not best serve the administration of justice.
It has been directly held in this state that failure of a
sheriff to produce in court the body of one in his
(Ex parte Sternes (1888), 77 Cal. 156, 163
P. 275, 11
Am.St.Rep. 251] ) , or failure of a parent to produce in court
a minor child of which such parent has
(In re Carr
(1944), 65 Cal.App.2d 681, 685-686 [151 P.2d 164] ), when
properly ordered so to do, constitutes a direct
whieh
may be summarily punished. On the
here material
the court in the Sternes case said
163 of 77 Cal.) : "The
failure of Sternes to produce the body of Ah
as the
court found he had the power to do, before the court, in
obedience to the writ, was a contempt committed in the face
of the court, and no affidavit of the facts
the
contempt was necessary to give the court knowledge thereof.''
In the Carr case the District Court of Appeal quoted from
and followed the Sternes case. (See also In rc Robb
,
64 Cal. 431 [1 P. 881]; 12 Am.Jur. 390-392.) Manifestly
an attorney at law, under the circumstances shown here and
in the absence of a showing to the contrary, may be inferred
to have at least as much control in respect to presenting or
absenting himself at court as can a sheriff or parent have
in relation to producing or sequestering a third person.
[2b] Likewise manifest, as has already been
is the
duty of an attorney, lacking a valid excuse, to be present at
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all times
the trial of a case in which he is sole counsel
for a party, and as an officer of the court he is bound to
respect and comply with its pertinent and lawful orders
in open court in his presence.
It is vigorously urged that the
in this case
imposed upon
before whom
tention that it is unwise to permit the
a contempt is committed to himself mete out the
Offutt v. United States (1954), 348 U.S. 11 [75 S.Ct.
11, 99 L.Ed.*
.) This contention,
does not
lead to the conclusion that the sentence in this case is void.
when vc,,u,uw:o<
The record shows that the following took
finally appeared in the courtroom at 2 :45 p.m.:
"THE CouRT: The record will show, in this case, that the
Court took a recess at 12 :00 o'clock p. m.; that everybody was
here at the hour o£ 2:00 o'clock except defense counsel, Lowell
Lyons, who has just appeared here at a quarter of 3 :00.
''The Court at 2 :35 issued a warrant for the apprehension
of the said counsel, but counsel appeared before the warrant
was served.
"The Court finds that cause exists for issuing the warrant,
and that the defendant's counsel should show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt.
''MR. J_,voNs : May I be heard at this time 1
''THE CoURT: Yes.
"MR. LYONS: Yes. At this time, if your Honor pleases, I
would like to point ont that I did intend to be here at 2 :00
o'clock. I was across the street in my office.
''Actually, I have no excuse, because I was asleep. I just
awoke. I have had a very bad cold. I overslept an hour.
''I had left word with the answering service in my office
to call me at a quarter to 2 :00. They said they did. Apparently I didn't hear, your Honor.
"I didn't get too much sleep last night. Apparently I
Heeded sleep. I overslept for that reason.
''I know of no other reason, your Honor. There was no
cause preventing me from appearing other than the fact I
was asleep in my office.
"Those are the facts. I have been there all the time. I
just awoke, and I came over immediately.
''THE CouRT: I don't consider that an excuse.
"This is the second time in this identical case that you've
done the same thing.
*L.Ed.Adv.Opn.: Page 7.
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I wasn't
There wasn't

anything wilful about it.
"THE CouRT: No reason
you shouldn't be here.
''In the former
we
the same
and we took a recess in the
and after the recess you
had
and couldn't be found on the floor
anywhere; and after
some time you
showed
up without offering any excuse.
'
vs.
that was on September 2, 1953, the
case was on the trial calendar and you failed to show up
at any time
that day. We discovered that you were
trying a case in the Municipal Court.
"There are a num her of instances of your being late, failing
to be present at a time when you should be present. And on
October 27 of 1953, we had a case of People vs. Streeter which
went over to OetobPr- 28 at 9 :80. You were not preS('Ilt. An
effort was made to locate you unsuccessfully. You finally
showed up at 9 :55 at your place at eounsel table and made no
excuse or explanation. You were informed you vvere in eontempt of eourt, and the Court at that time found you in
contempt.
''This has been such a chronie, habitual situation, the
Court finds that you are now in contempt.
"It is the judgment and sentence of this Court for said
contempt you be imprisoned in the County ,Jail for five 24hour days.''
[7] As expressly stated in the commitment the court did
not-and it was not bound to-believe petitioner's unsworn
statement that he fail(~d to appear at the appointed hour for
resumption of the trial because he had been asleep. Nevertheless, the very character and extent of petitioner's derelictions
as found in the commitment seem to indieate that perhaps his
misconduct may have been contributed to by illness of some
form. "Whether such misconduct was on the one hand deliberately and malieionsly calculated or, on the other hand was
materially contributed to by illness or other mitigating condition, is a matter of substantial moment to the petitioner and
to the court. [8] As carefully pointed out by this court
when it first gave consideration to the subject (People v.
Turner (1850), supra, 1 Cal. 152, 158) and as has never been
doubted, the power to adjudicate a direct contempt ''is necessarily of an arbitrary nature, and should be used with great
prudence and caution. A judge should bear in mind that he is

,Jan.

LYONS

v.

SuPERIOR CouRT

[43 C.2d 755; 278 P.2d 6811

763

not so much in vinili<·at
his own
as in
the
due to the administration of the laws;
:cmd this consideration should induce him to receive as satisfactory any reason a hle
for an offender's conduct."
even whrre the finding of
appears essential to the proper conduct of the court's business no class of
nffense O(:curs to us in \Yhich the court should more readily
search out and
effect to mitigating circumstances than in
eases of direct contempts. [9] 'Whether grounds exist upon
which execution of the punishment here imposed should be
rmnitted in whole or in part is a question which can be ininto by the trial court on a proper application by petitioner. (See City of Vernon v.
Cottrt (1952), 38
Cal. 2d 50!), 520 [ 241 P .2d 243] ; City
Vernon v.
Uourl (
, B9 Cal.2d 8:39, 843 [250 P.2d
.)
l''or the reasons above stated, tlw judgment of contempt
is affirmed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Edmonds, ,J ., and Spenee, ,J ., eoneurred.

CAHTEH, J .-I dissent.
l agree that the failure of an attorney to attend court
at the appointed time for trial of a criminal case, when he
is representing a client whose case is being tried, may be
eontempt of court if he has no valid exeuse and the judicial
processes are obstrm,ted. (ICx parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121 [106
S.W. 990, 15 L.RA.N.S. 389]; In re McHugh, 152 Mich. 505
1116 N.W. 45UJ; Wise v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 779 [34
S.E. 458]; People v. McDonnell, 307 Ill.App. :368 [30 N.E.2d
80 J, affirmed 377 IlL 568 [37 N.E.2d 159) ; Nelson v. Wergland, 104 N.J.Eq. 334 [146 A. 32j; Vincent v. Vincent, 108
"\L,J.Eq. 136 [154 A. 328] ; Appea1 of Levine, 372 Pa. 612 [95
A.2d 222]; Klein v. United States, 151 F.2d 286 [80 App. D.C.
106]; see In r·e Walker, 275 App.Div. 688 [86 N.Y.S.2d 726];
In re Mackay, 140 Cal.App. 400 [35 P.2d 385]; Sellers v.
Whaley, 84 Ga.App. 715 [67 S.E.2d 241].) However, I
cannot conceive how such contempt would be direct. rl'he
statute specifically requires that for a contempt to be direct
it must involve conduct in the "irnrnecliate view and presence
of the court" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211). Sueh eon tempt may
be punished summarily beeause the conduct eoncerned, and
all of it, took place where the court heard and saw it, hence
the court is in a position to act summarily, as all the facts
involved are within his cognizance, and there exists a need

SuPERJOR

Comt•r

r~ontinunnee

C.2d

of aetions which
and obstrud the judieial
JH'oce:ss.
do not exist. The only faet
that tht~ t•IJI!l't knew about was tlmt petitioner did not appear
tlw trial. J t did not know whether that failure \Yas due
lo cin·Hm;.;taJwe:~
tiouer
eontrol or waN inex''l!:sabk
t IJt' wilfal rd'usal to attt~lld the trial. \Vithout
thost'
all of whil'h ot:cllrl'ed away from the eourt, and
out of its
Land
it \nls nut iu a positio11 to ast:erwhether tlwre was eontempt.
The
opinion Ita:.; little to say upon this subjed
to express its firm belief that petitimter was guilty ui
It says: "The latter, not the judge, is the officer
td: the t:onrt who nnder those eirc:nmstances owes a duty of
'l'ht: eJfeet of a eontrary holding would be to
ab;:;ol n• the dd'aul ti ng attorney from any burden of cxplanat ion of hi;;
no matter how flagrant and often repeated,
unles::; the
1akes the burden of filing a charge and in:stitutillg formal proceedings. This would make of the judge
not a judieial offiecr earryiug out the re~ponsibilities of his
oiliec, but a eomplaining witness in an aflYersary proeeeding.
Snl'h a rule, we think, would not only be c'ontrary to long es·
taiJlis!Jed law but wonld not best serve tlw administration of
jnsti(·e." 'l'his is wholly beside the point. Ewn if we assume
petitionu should have the bunlen of exeusing his failure to
app('aJ', still it should be after affidayit and hearing beeause
the basis of any exense for his eonclnd c·oulcl not be known to
tl!C' <'Ourt. In fad no great burden is east upon the judge beeanse the fad ot the failure to appear vvould ordinarily not
be disputable while the main issue, the existence of an excuse,
\Hmlcl involn events a·way from the eourL In ltlein v.
/'uited
suzn·a, 1Gl F.2d 286, 288, the question prest•lJted,
I he same as here, was whethet· the failure of an
at tol'lli'.Y to appear was direet or indireet eoutempt. The eourt
llel d the c:ontem pt indired, stating: " ' . . . The petitioner
f eontenmor] himself was absent. His aets ad interim were
likewise absent. His doings \vent with him. It would seem
like an exquisite and palpable contradiction of terms to complain in one breath that the petitioner [contemnor] and his
Hets were absent, and in the next breath to say that sneh
absenec c:onstituted a preo;cnre; that is, a contempt committed
iu the presenee of the court.' " The sarne issue was presented
in F:.1: parte Clark, 208 1\fo. 121 [106 S.W. 990, 997, 15
LH. A .N.S. 389], and the same result reaehed and the eourt
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said: "The
made and recited of the
his intentional absence from the courtroom to the
embarrassment of a trial in which the petitioner was
in counsel, 15 minutes at one time and 55 at another. The
petitioner himself was absent. His acts ad interim were likewise absent. His doings went with him. It would seem like
an exquisite and palpable contradiction of terms to
in one breatl1 that the petitioner and his acts ·were
in the next breath to say that such absence constituted a
presence; that is, a contempt committed in the presence of the
court. 'l'he absence of an attorney, a juryman, a witness, an
officer (including even a member of the bench himself), from
the courtroom at the precise time due there may be susceptible
of many innocent explanations. Each and every one of these
absences are of a kind and, hence on a level, and none of these
explanations are ·within the mere eyesight or earshot of any
court of ordinary mortal endowments. These explanations can
only come to the court by evidence aliunde his eye or ear, so
that it would seem that absence ought not to be dealt with
as essentially in the same class as things that happen in the
view or hearing of the court. We think that is the more
gracious and the better view comporting with the good sense
of the thing, comes well within the quoted definition of an
indirect contempt, and is sustained by the reasoning of wellconsidered cases." The same was held in 8tate v. Winthrop,
148 Wash. 526 [269 P. 793, 795, 59 A.L.R. 1265], the court
saying: "It is plain, we think, by this record, that appellant's
conduct, viewed by the court as contemptuous, consisted in
his inexcusable absence from the court when the case of
Lynch v. Page was called for trial. vVe are unable to see how
such absence on the part of appellant occnrred in the presence
or view of the court." To the same effect is Ex parte Hill,
122 Tex. 80 [52 S.W.2d 367, 368], \Vbere the court said: "It
affirmatively appears therefrom that the district court has
attempted to enter a summary :final order adjudging relator in
(•ontempt for an allrged act of contempt, which, if it occurred
at all, occnrrrd outside the presence of the court. It is true
that the judgment recites 'said actions were committed and
done in the presence of the Court,' etc., but the judgment also
affirmatively shows that the offense relator was accused of was
the act of being thirty minutes late in attending court. In
other words, the alleged act of contempt was for being absent
from court. Obviously the offense of being absent from court
could not take place in the presence of the court. W c there-
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fore take it that the statement in the judgment to the effect
that the
occurred in the presence of the court is an
erroneous
conelusion not
the facts found,
but utterly repugnant thereto.
"We do not think that the fact that when the relator
did appear in court he attempted to offer the court an explanation for his
tardiness meets the rules of due process
to
the court power to punish him for
''
.1.uuco•cou, where the
question here
has been
involved and the matter discussed there is a unanimity of
that the contempt is indirect. Yet this court
chooses a contrary course without reason and in face of the
principle that contempt is a serious matter and should not
be dealt with summarily unless the conduct is clearly within
the immediate view and presence of the court. It relies
upon two cases, Ex parte Sternes, 77 Cal. 156 [19 P. 275, 11
Am.St.Rep. 251], and In re Carr, 65 Cal.App.2d 681 [151
P.2d 164], which do not involve the question here presented,
are not in point and are of doubtful validity. In the Sternes
case the person found guilty of contempt was a deputy sheriff
who failed to produce his prisoner in habeas corpus proceedings. The court was primarily concerned with whether
he could attack the court's contempt judgment. There was
a hearing on the very question of whether the deputy had the
ability to produce the prisoner. The court said: "The first
inquiry before the superior court upon the return made by
the respondent Sternes [deputy] therein was to determine
the issue as to whether said Ah Fong was or was not in his
custody or under his control at the time of the issuance
of or service of said writ upon him, said Sternes. It appears
from the judgment that the judge proceeded to take testimony as to said matter, and found as a fact that said Ah
.B'ong was in the custody and under the control of said Sternes
at the time of the issuance and service upon him of said writ,
and that it was within the power of said Sternes to produce
the body of said Ah Fong in obedience to the writ at the
time of service of the writ upon him. This is the record of
the court, acting within its legitimate powers, and that
record must be considered as speaking the truth, and as
conclusive until it has been in some way set aside or vacated.''
(Emphasis added.) While the court did thereafter say that
the deputy's failure to produce the prisoner was a direct
contempt, it did so for the reason that : ''An order to show
cause or notice of a motion for an attachment would not have

767

of
and thE' court was not in
to the writ. 'l'he court
~-·~~·~.·"·~~" to the issuance
CHC;HCLlVU of the facts
or misconstruction of the
here a
but so
record to remain as it is, other courts must treat it as
aetion of that eourt, and as conelusive upon all the matters
decided
it and essential to its judgment."
pm·te
st£pra, 77 Cal. 156, 163.) In other words, notice and
were had. In the Carr case the order was for a
mother to produce her child, and she had been so ordered
while she was in eourt and the matter was continued at her
Y'd'""w'" and aceordingly the District Court of Appeal stated:
''. . . petitioner had an opportunity before the order was
made to explain the reasons of her failure to obey" it. The
real holding in those cases is that the requirement of an
affidavit may be waived rather than that the contempt was
direct. Such holding is, of course, contrary to the law.
(Phillips v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.2d 256 [137 P.2d 838] ;
Frowley v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. 220 [110 P. 817] ; In re
Davis, 31 Cal.2d 451 [189 P.2d 283].) Moreover, it has been
held that such eonduct is an indirect contempt. (In re Rose,
90 Cal.App.2d 299 [202 P.2d 1064] ; Hughes v. Moncur, 28
CaLApp. 462 [152 P. 968] .)
'l'he subject has been analyzed : ''A direct contempt being
an open insult to the person of the judges while presiding
or a resistance to the powers of the court in its presence,
while a construetive contempt is an act done, not in the
presence of the court, but at a distance which resists the
court's authority, as, for instance, disobedience to process or
an order of the court such as tends in its operation to
obstruct, interrupt, prevent, or embarrass the administration
of jnstice. Direct contempts include only those aets of whieh
the court itself has personal knowledge; which takes place in
the presence of the court or so near physically as to impede
the proceedings. Indirect contempts eonsist of all contemptuous acts which occur out of the presence of the cmirt, and
of which the court itself has no personal offieial knowledge.
(Dangel, Contempt, § 14.)
The majority opinion states: ''As expressly stated in the
commitment the court did not-and it was not bound to-be-
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unsworn statement that he
to appear
the trial because he
the very character and extent
's derelictions as found in the commitment seem
to indicate that perhaps his misconduct may have been contributed to by illness of some form. Whether such misconduct was on the one hand
and maliciously ealc:nlated or, on the other hand was
contributed to
illness or other
condition, is a matter of substantial moment to the petitioner and to the court." (Emadded.) But it must be remembered that petitioner
had no opportunity to present evidence in support of his
excuse for being late. He had been found guilty of contempt even b~ore he arrived in court after the noon recess.
The situation would not have been different if petitioner had
stated that his automobile had broken down on his way to
court, or that the public transportation system, which he was
using, failed to function. In either case, according to the
majority view, the court was not bound to believe petitioner
or accord him an opportunity to furnish proof of the truth
of his statement. In other words, his mere absence from
court at the time fixed for his appearance is conclusive proof
of his guilt, and he is accorded no opportunity of showing that
his failure to appear was wholly blameless.
The situation here presents an ideal case for the application of the rules which must be applied in cases of indirect
contempt. The alleged contemptuous conduct does not take
place in the presence or hearing of the court, and notice and
hearing must therefore be had to give the court jurisdiction.
Under the holding of the majority here, whenever an attorney is late for a court session, the judge can find him
guilty of contempt and sentence him to five days in jail without complaint, hearing or evidence, regardless of any excuse
or justification the attorney may have to offer. In my opinion
such a holding is out of harmony with both the statutes of
this state and the great weight of authority in state and
federal jurisdictions.
For the foregoing reasons I would annul the judgment
of contempt here imposed.
Shenk, .T., and Traynor, .T., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied February 10, 1955. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were
of the opinion that the application should be granted.

